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Abstract 
This paper considers criminal justice policy in English and Wales since the Transforming 
Rehabilitation, TR, agenda implemented in 2013. TR rested on the proposition that probation 
services are best provided in a market context. Motivated by profit and extrinsic rewards, private 
sector consortia, and their employees, theoretically act efficiently to deter and rehabilitate offenders 
from crime.  
However, there is evidence that marketisation itself undermines the prospects of efficient social 
policy. Over-reliance on markets may undermine pro-social norms through emphasising 
individualism and extrinsic returns. Outsourcing is also associated with increasing inequality, which 
may also undermine pro-social norms. Further, the emphasis placed on self-interest in framing 
market-based incentive structures is associated with declining public welfare support for the 
economically marginalised and increased use of relatively expensive incarceration.  
In application, TR proved unsustainable. The innovation involves increasing reliance on the para-
state sector, in which private profits rely on public payment. However, the profits expected under TR 
fell short of expectations; in part due to changes in wider society. The early cancellation of TR 
contracts highlights the inflexible nature of such public sector procurement.  
On the basis of theory and practice, we suggest a reconsideration of the government’s position on 
probation and set out reasonable steps to address shortcomings in the current system. 
1. Introduction 
The England and Wales’ criminal justice system is undergoing a period of rapid and unprecedented 
change. This process is informed by a body of political theory sometimes called neo-liberalism; that 
is to say, that body of theory emphasising market-based solutions to social and economic problems.  
This paradigm, introduced into the UK political economic landscape as monetarism and/or neo-
classical economics by Thatcher’s Conservative government of 1979 (Hall, 1993) was mirrored by the 
Reagan administration’s supply-side economics in the USA (Feldstein, 1986). It continued through 
the Blair years (Hall, 2011) and since through the continued emphasis on marketisation and 
privatisation and such programmes as New Public Management. 
Here, we consider the use of marketised solutions in the criminal justice sector, particularly in the 
area of probation under the UK government’s Transforming Rehabilitation, TR, agenda. TR was a 
market-oriented innovation which, it was argued, would achieve efficiency gains and cost savings in 
the criminal justice sector, particularly in probation. Despite the Ministry of Justice’s stated 
commitment to evidence-based policy (Ministry of Justice 2014d: 3), TR was rolled out without being 
piloted. At the time of writing, however, it is clear it has failed to deliver on its promise.  
In the following, we present a theoretical and practical critique of TR and suggest an alternative 
approach which might address some of the short-comings of the policy. In section 2 we give a brief 
history of TR and summarise the state of play of probation in England and Wales. In section 3 we 
contrast the incentive structures of the people, the public sector, and the corporate sector. We 
theorise the drive for marketisation in section 4, in particular considering matters of cost 
effectiveness, promoting innovation and localism. The negative social and moral impacts of 
marketisation are discussed in sections 5 and 6. The role of evaluation is discussed in section 7 and 
the implications of our analyses are presented in section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper. 
2. A Brief History of TR 
Under the UK Coalition Government (2010-15), early ideas on reform of the probation service 
envisaged a number of probation innovation pilot projects subject to Payment by Results and 
devolution of the commissioning of community offender services to the existing 35 Probation Trusts.  
Under the provisions of the 2007 Offender Management Act (HM Government 2007), (initially) 42 
free-standing local Probation Trusts were to be created. The act gave the Secretary of State power to 
commission probation services and allowed for the marketisation of whole trusts. The aim was to 
encourage new market entrants from the voluntary, private and public sectors (Ministry of Justice, 
2012). Probation Trusts would continue to deliver services to high-risk offenders and could compete 
to run other services.  
However, following a change of Secretary of State,1 these approaches were discontinued (Bannister 
et al. 2016) for the more radical Transforming Rehabilitation, TR, strategy (Ministry of Justice 2013a, 
b). Probation Trusts were abolished and provision of the majority of community-based offender 
services were subcontracted. Work with high-risk offenders, assessments and court reports passed 
to a new (public sector) National Probation Service, NPS.  
The TR strategy also extended offender services provision to 45,000 adult offenders released after 
serving sentences of less than 12 months. Those serving such sentences previously received no 
probation support on release. The Ministry anticipated the efficiency gains necessary to support 
such an expansion could be realised through marketisation (Ministry of Justice, 2013a: 5). 
Under TR, innovation remained a stated aim of reform. There are nine references to ‘innovation’ or 
‘innovating’ in the Strategy. However, compared to the 2010 Green Paper, the scope of innovation 
had narrowed (Fox and Marsh 2016). There was one reference to giving “front-line professionals the 
flexibility and resources to innovate and do what works” (Ministry of Justice 2013b: 3). There were 
five references to setting up the conditions to allow commissioned service providers to innovate. 
                                                          
1  Chris Grayling succeeded Kenneth Clarke CH QC in September 2012. 
There were three references to innovation around payment mechanisms and financing. Innovation 
was assumed to arise from the application of technology to improve business processes, and a focus 
on achieving outcomes. (Ministry of Justice 2014a).  
It is noticeable these references indicate the expectation that innovation will come from 
commissioned service providers (i.e. predominantly providers from the private and not-for-profit 
sectors) and the use of technology and/or ‘back office’ efficiencies, not from the new publicly run 
National Probation Service. Neither, in these documents, were there references to innovation 
involving social entrepreneurs and local communities (Fox and Marsh 2016).  
In a reversal of the earlier emphasis on local services, there was a national competition to provide 
geographical ‘bundles’ of probation services through Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs). 
Contracts for CRCs included an element of Outcomes Based Commissioning. Despite their sectoral 
experience, existing Probation Trusts were excluded from bidding. Probation staff might bid through 
their setting up new independent entities such as employee-led mutuals (Cabinet Office 2013). 
However, the formation of such mutuals was regulated (Cabinet Office 2014) and in practice, few 
were formed. 
The new organisations, the CRCs and the NPS, were launched in June 2014, and originally publicly 
run. From February 2015 new ‘owners’ began their contracted period of management of CRCs. 
Virtually all the main contractors were from the private sector. Only one CRC was led by a 
consortium in which the main or ‘prime-contractor’ was a not-for-profit organisation and employee-
led mutuals or staff Community Interest Companies were part of only 7 out of 21 winning bids to run 
CRCs (Fox and Marsh 2016). 
However, the TR revolution failed to deliver on its ideological premise. By 2017 it was clear 
contractors had underbid to run CRCs and were struggling financially, despite many having invested 
little in new service delivery (HM Inspectorate of Probation and HM Inspectorate of Prisons 2017: 
10).  
This necessitated the injection of additional taxpayer funds to the tune of £342 million (National 
Audit Office 2017) to address systemic failure of the innovation. A further £170 million will be 
needed to stabilise CRCs and improve service delivery until 2020 (Times 2018) when the current 
contracts end, two years ahead of the original schedule. The Ministry of Justice will indeed spend 
less on delivering probation services than they had planned, given the much reduced demand for 
CRC services. It is not clear, however, whether cost savings will be achieved relative to pre-existing 
provisions. 
The benefits of the TR experiment are, at best, unclear and it is clear the current system is 
unsustainable financially. The government has recently engaged on a public consultation to 
determine an appropriate way forward for probation in England and Wales (Ministry of Justice 
2018).  
3. Motivations: Citizens, corporations and states 
Political economic analysis of modern capitalist democracies highlights a tension between political 
aims of government and the aims of business and industry on which national prosperity depends 
(c.f. McIver, 1947). Democratic government, responding to and reflecting – and in some degree 
shaping – the will of the citizens, is social in terms of the output which stakeholders (voters) demand 
(ibid.). Democratic government may, of course, own and operate economically productive resources, 
(so-called ‘nationalised’ industries), but in theory, only insofar as this ownership promotes social 
goals.  
Capitalist industry, on the other hand, responding to and reflecting – and, where capitalists enjoy 
market power, shaping – markets, reflects the will of owners and managers irrespective of 
citizenship; its outputs are financial. Capitalist industry might generate social returns, for example, 
employment, but according to classical economic theory (Friedman 1962: 113, 1970), only insofar as 
social output increases financial returns. 
In recent decades, a consensus has developed in an attempt to reconcile these competing goals. 
Sometimes termed neo-liberalism, or the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson, 1999), this paradigm 
suggests democratic governments ‘incentivise’ the efficient provision of social goods through 
markets. In its role of market creator, the state must step back from providing goods and services 
directly: This involves either the sale of public assets (privatisation) or through sub-contracting 
existing social services (marketisation). 
There remains a role for the state in neo-liberal theory, where government is able to provide social 
goods demonstrably more efficiently than might amoral market forces or the self-interested actions 
of individuals and corporations (HM Government, 2011: 29).2 Policies informed by the neo-liberal 
paradigm in general promote: globalised ‘free’ markets; private property; the application of 
individual incentive structures; and a circumscribed role for democratically accountable government 
(Gore, 2000). 
Based as it is on private property, the maintenance of the rule of law is a primary goal of neo-liberal 
theory. As set out in Friedman (1962), Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973, 1996), for example, such an 
approach argues that it is the responsibility of the public, through the state, to create an incentive 
structure such that it is in individuals’ and corporations’ best interests to commit no more than an 
optimal amount of crime.  
In sum, the two goals of promoting market solutions and limiting the size of democratic government 
– in part justified through questioning the efficacy of the state – suggest the provision of public 
goods be facilitated through the processes of privatisation and marketisation. Neo-liberalism as a 
project of economic and social transformation has also driven market-based institutional 
arrangements in the public sector through New Public Management (Connell et al. 2009).  
Here we are concerned with the process of marketisation, the out-sourcing of the delivery of social 
goods to the para-state sector, the sector of the economy in which private corporations are publicly 
funded (Buchanan et al. 2009). 
                                                          
2  It should be noted that many of the early neo-liberal theorists were concerned that, where natural 
monopolies exist, for example in utilities and public services, state provision should be preferred over 
private provision on the grounds of the democratic accountability a liberal state may provide over the 
abuse of monopoly power (c.f. Van Horn and Mirowski 2008). 
4. Theorising Marketisation 
The UK government’s motivation for privatisation in general has been summarised for the House of 
Commons Library (Rhodes et al., 2014) as motivated by the desire to: raise funds without having to 
increase tax or borrowing; improve business efficiency; and promote democratic capitalism. 
Alongside of this, the private sector may seek (Fraser et al. 2018) to: increase profits; diversify 
revenue streams; demonstrate corporate social responsibility; and (Albertson et al. 2018) promote 
social innovation. There may well also be ideological reasons: Some have argued government has no 
role to play in any profitable activity (Harvey 2012). 
Of the government’s motivations in the matter of outsourcing we can set aside for the purposes of 
this argument the raising of funds and the promotion of democratic capitalism. Insofar as promoting 
efficiency is concerned, three themes seem to dominate in criminal justice procurement: The desire 
to drive down costs (Cameron 2013); to encourage more innovation; and to transfer the risk of 
policy failure to the private sector (Albertson et al. 2018). 
This transfer of risk is facilitated, in part, through Outcomes Based Commissioning, OBC. OBC, such 
as Payment by Results, PbR, formed a substantial element in the TR process. In theory, PbR links 
payment for public services to the outcomes achieved by the private contractor (Cabinet Office 
2011). In theory, by making some or all of the payment for a service contingent on independent 
verification of the delivery of agreed outcomes, PbR encourages efficiency and innovation. 
According to classical economic theory, the advantages of marketisation require that the market is 
sufficiently large that no provider can influence the terms and conditions under which trade takes 
place. Theory also suggests, where the state contracts out for public provision, such contracting 
should be at as local a level (Friedman 1962: 11), and with as many diverse suppliers, as possible. 
Irrespective of ideological positions taken on public out-sourcing, micro-commissioning differs from, 
and (in theory) is more likely to lead to real innovation than, macro-commissioning (Albertson 2014).  
In early plans for marketisation the growing of the supplier base was a central part of the new 
commissioning strategy (Ministry of Justice 2010: 8). In practice, this aspiration was not realised. As 
a result of the adoption of PbR models only large organisations with substantial capital reserves, or 
access to substantial flows of credit, could take on the risk of relying on payments for reductions in 
re-offending rates. Such reductions take some time to be assessed implying substantial delays 
between the up-front costs of service delivery and subsequent payment (House of Commons Justice 
Committee 2014:77). 
Ultimately, over half of all 21 CRC contracts were awarded to two large out-sourcing corporations 
(Ministry of Justice 2014b). A third of all probation services are delivered through the NPS, a 
national, rather than localised, service. The involvement of the voluntary sector in the new CRC 
supply chain is limited and declining (HMIP 2018: 11-12) and voluntary sector capacity and 
experience has been lost to the sector. The transformation process has also increased the risk of 
closure of service providers (Clinks 2016).  
The government’s chosen approach to probation marketisation appears rather to be concentrating, 
not growing, the suppliers of rehabilitative services and centralising, rather than localising, provision. 
5. The Social Impact of Marketisation 
In the supposed cause of efficiency and innovation the Ministry of Justice has cast criminal justice 
provision as a market. The role of the state is to serve as a “market creator rather than a service 
deliverer” (Gough 2012: 20). However, both economic theory and recent history indicate the 
emphasis on markets is fraught with unexpected complexity.  
In the first place, the explicit introduction of the profit motive into social provision creates a tension 
between the state’s desire to reduce expenditure, and the incentive of the para-state sector to lobby 
for increased public spending on out-sourcing (Bell 2011; Ludlow 2014: 67; Fitzgibbon and Lea 
2014:24).  
Notwithstanding the political and corporate appetite for outsourcing, the UK public are rather more 
sceptical. Since 1979, the majority of the public have disapproved of UK privatisation and 
marketisation policies (Institute for Government 2012) and, in the area of provision of public goods, 
still do (YouGov 2015, Elliott & Kanagasooriam 2017). It is only by ignoring voters’ views government 
can proceed with this agenda.  
The electorate may be right to be cautious. Past privatisations have resulted in both winners and 
losers: In general the public and staff of privatised corporations being in the latter category; and 
investors; bankers, CEOs and corporate stock-holders being in the former category (High Pay Centre 
2014). Recent evidence suggests the traditional HR approach of newly privatised industries – the 
shedding of staff and deterioration in terms and conditions – are being observed in the probation 
sector as a whole (Kirton and Guillaume 2015). 
Similarly, in the public sector, Connell et al. argue New Public Management’s emphasis on labour 
market ‘flexibility’ has produced a growing workforce of part-time, casual and contract labour at the 
bottom of organisations along with a shift from “many-levelled, finely graded bureaucratic pyramids 
with strong professional specializations, to ‘flat’ organizational structures and generic skills” (Connell 
et al. 2009: 334). This is accompanied by an increased emphasis on organisational, team and 
individual performance management (ibid.).  
There is evidence outsourcing in general, whether in the private or public sector, is a major driver of 
the increasing incomes inequality and poverty under which the citizens of the UK and USA have 
suffered since the 1980s (Weil 2014; The Equality Trust 2014; Schmieder & Goldschmidt 2016; 
Appelbaum 2017). Insofar as terms and conditions are reduced in marketised or privatised 
industries, there is less money (through employees’ salaries) flowing into local economies and this is 
likely to reduce economic growth (Greenwood 2014).  
As Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) note, scarcity generally increases the tendency of human beings 
to react more in line with the theory of homo-economicus, which is to say, amorally. A host of other 
social problems associated with inequality has been highlighted by, for example, Wilkinson & Pickett 
(2009), Atkinson (2015) and Dorling (2017). At a national level, when a society is not achieving 
material progress for the broad cross-section of its citizens, it is also less able to make progress in 
moral dimensions (Friedman, 2006).  
6. The Moral Impact of Marketisation 
The reliance on marketised transactions in society are often presented as being morally neutral, or 
even morally improving (see, e.g. Thatcher 1977, 1986, Cameron 2012). However, the general 
promotion of market-based principles, with the associated implicit acceptance of self-centred 
behaviour, carries risks with it. There is a distinction between the intrinsically motivated observance 
of social contracts (Hobbes 1651), moral self-image maintenance (Mazar and Ariely 2006; Mazar et 
al. 2008) and the self-serving maximisation of extrinsic rewards through the market (Gneezy and 
Rustichini 2000a, b; Levitt and Dubner 2005; Ariely 2008).  
In general, the costs and benefits of decisions are assessed differently depending on the context in 
which these decisions take place. Stout (2011) suggests people use different neural pathways when 
they make selfish and unselfish decisions and “the trigger seems to be something social 
psychologists call social context” (ibid.: 96). As self-centred behaviour becomes an increasingly 
acceptable social norm, the emphasis on extrinsic rewards tends to drive out altruism and erode 
conscience (Stout 2012; Ariely 2008).  
Such an analysis, alongside the increasing inequality associated with neo-liberal policies, may explain 
a long-term hardening of public attitudes towards redistribution and welfare (Park et al. 2012). The 
2014 British Social Attitudes Survey (Park et al. 2014) data highlights these trends in attitudes have 
become exacerbated since the onset of the global financial crisis. Also, the increasing emphasis 
placed on individuality and self-interest has seen the state’s response to social marginality shift from 
welfare support to incarceration (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006, Currie, 2013, Wacquant 2009; 2012). 
As Garland (1996: 445) points out, in general weak states require harsher punitive sanctions. 
In sum, classical economics fails to consider the detrimental effects of using price incentives for 
social goods. These detrimental effects arise because reliance on fiscal incentives can discourage 
conscientious behaviour and instead encourage opportunism and even illegality (Stout 2012): thus 
(the appearance of) compliance is promoted above – or instead of – ethics. As ethical and social 
constraints on illicit behaviour erode, we may expect to see relatively more illicit activity (Mazar et 
al. 2008) and relatively less efficient markets (Zak 2011). Ultimately, the over-reliance on markets in 
social transactions (of which criminal justice outsourcing is just one symptom) is itself socially 
destructive (Röpke 1952) and criminogenic (Reiner 2007). Such reliance is neither approved by, nor 
in the interests of, the people of England and Wales.3 
7. Evaluation in and of TR 
The theoretical driving force behind the efficiency of markets is through the coordination of 
economic activity. The theory of marketisation, however, ignores the difficulty of creating 
appropriate incentives. In practice, there is little evidence past governments, whether Conservative, 
New Labour or Coalition, have managed to achieve value for money on behalf of the British taxpayer 
in their attempts to align corporate and public interests (King and Crewe 2014). 
Where society incorporated in the state is theorised as a customer of private enterprise, it must be 
clear what is being bought and sold, and at what price, if the market is to work effectively. In the 
                                                          
3  Scotland’s criminal justice sector and wider public sector is increasingly diverging from England and Wales 
and Northern Ireland is a special case where different considerations apply. 
case of the purchase of a commodity of criminal justice, there must be some kind of measure which 
will indicate the degree of justice which has been delivered. Under TR, CRCs were to be paid in part 
for managing the cases allocated to them with a proportion of their payment dependent on their 
performance with respect to an appropriate indicator of results. The use of such indicators 
motivates the whole concept of Outcomes Based Commissioning, in general and Payment by Results 
in this case. 
In TR, the ‘results’ which would trigger PbR were based on a binary metric (the reoffending rate; the 
percentage of offenders in a cohort that reoffend) and a frequency metric (the frequency of 
reoffending; the number of reoffences per reoffender). The binary reoffending measure provided 
the initial ‘hurdle’ to be cleared: Unless the reoffending rate was below the reoffending baseline, no 
payment was made on the frequency metric (Ministry of Justice 2014c).  
Even leaving aside the technical challenges associated with such performance metrics (Fox and 
Albertson 2011), the adoption of targets as a substitute for effectively operating markets has been 
shown to lead to inefficiency (Campbell, 1979: 34). In general, the market will deliver the most 
efficient way of hitting any target, whether or not this target accurately reflects the goal of interest 
to the customer (ibid.). This is known in general parlance as ‘hitting the target, but missing the point’ 
or ‘gaming’ (Bevan and Hood 2006, McLean et al. 2007, Patrick 2011).  
The distortion of PbR indicators is an example of a problem which results from the application of 
performance based pay. In general, where there is a complicated result outcome, poorly designed 
contracts can erode conscience and the use of performance measures may promote (incentivise) 
distortions (Stout 2012).  
Curiously, for an innovation which is supposedly based on evidence, the appeal to PbR by the UK 
government is itself lacking in evidence as “neither the Cabinet Office nor the Treasury currently 
monitors how PbR is operating across government.” National Audit Office (2015: 13). Because of this 
lack of evidence (ibid.: p.8), “PbR contracts are hard to get right, which makes them risky and costly 
for commissioners”.  
In practice, however, despite the potential for gaming, the ‘results’ anticipated by the government 
and the CRCs are disappointing. In their evaluation of “Through the Gate”, an integral part of TR, HM 
Inspectorate of Probation and HM Inspectorate of Prisons (2017: 10) noted, “It is hard to see any 
impact of the prospect of future payment by results for reducing reoffending rates”, despite the 
commitment of staff to meeting contractual targets. 
The recent release of data allowing the preliminary evaluation of TR indicate the reoffending rate is 
lower than the baseline rate in most CRCs. However, only in two CRCs was the decline in frequency 
of re-offending sufficient to trigger payment for results (Cattell 2018). In the other 19 CRCs, the 
frequency of reoffending has increased (ibid.). The Ministry of Justice (2018) reports, with continuing 
increases in the frequency of re-offending affecting their PbR income, most CRC owners were 
expected to end up paying the Ministry “a substantial amount of money” (ibid.: 19) over the 
remaining years of their contracts.  
Citing a variety of reasons, including overall performance not being good enough, the Ministry of 
Justice (2018) has decided to terminate the current CRC contracts in 2020; two years early. In the 
meantime, the government has invested an additional £342 million in TR, including waiving a 
proportion of the performance related fines (National Audit Office 2017).  
8. Implications 
It is clear that the government’s TR experiment has failed the public, who were reasonably entitled 
to expect either reduced payments or results, and the para-state sector who, despite being bailed 
out by the government, have failed to realise expected profits. Neither have offenders been well 
served by the transformed probation services with the Chief Inspector of Probation highly critical of 
the quality of service experienced by many offenders (Stacey 2017). Yet lessons remain to be 
learned. 
In their consultation document on the future of probation services in England and Wales, the 
Ministry of Justice (2018) refers to the “sound principles” of TR on which they hope to build in yet 
another transformation. These include: the extension of post-release supervision to short-sentenced 
prisoners; opening up the probation market; creating new incentives to reduce reoffending; and 
ensuring a stronger focus on higher-risk offenders. Of these, the first was an innovation, but there is 
no reason why it could not have been achieved in the pre-existing service. TR clearly failed in its 
second principle, as documented by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons (2017) and acknowledged 
in the Ministry of Justice consultation document. There is only limited evidence of progress in 
achieving the third principle. Insofar as TR did create new incentives to reduce reoffending, these are 
likely largely to be abandoned after 2020 as probation moves rather more to a ‘pay for inputs’ rather 
than a pay for results funding model. Ultimately, the creation of the NPS has, arguably, created a 
stronger focus on high-risk offenders, but, again, there is no reason why this could not have been a 
goal of the pre-existing system.  
Despite this lack of progress, the government remains ideologically committed to the overall model 
of outsourcing and consolidation of probation services as indicated by the limited terms of the 
consultation document (ibid.). The Ministry intends to reduce still further the number of CRCs, to ten 
in England, while retaining the unitary CRC for Wales. Other than in Wales, where the CRC is to 
return to the public sector, the government’s trust in the private sector to innovate and reduce costs 
remains firm and there is no indication the English CRCs will be publicly run but will rather continue 
to be managed by para-state corporations. 
Insofar as the government’s long-standing commitment to privatisation and marketisation has any 
theoretical framework, our analysis suggests that progress is more likely if the following principles 
are adopted: 
i. Public provision of public goods. Hand overall responsibility for the delivery of probation 
services back to the public sector, but allow for a mixed economy of provision that includes 
opportunities for both private and not-for-profit providers to contribute where they are best 
placed to deliver specific services (Fox et al. 2013). In the UK there has always been a mixed 
economy in the provision of ‘public services’ in terms of the balance between public and 
private provision, finance and control (Hills 2011). However, New Public Management, with 
its emphasis on private sector management, marketization and performance management, 
is the wrong model for conceptualising the next round of transformation in public services, 
including criminal justice services. New Public Governance (Osborne 2006), which recognises 
the plural and pluralist nature of the State and with its focus on inter-organizational 
governance and emphasis on service processes and outcomes – recognising that desired 
social outcomes are emergent properties of complex systems (Lowe 2017) –, offers a more 
appropriate theoretical framework. 
ii. Emphasise localism. Localism is supported, in theory, both by classical economics and the 
government’s stated goal of opening up provision. However, current centralised sub-
contracting of probation services rather undermines this (Albertson and Fox 2014). If there is 
to be out-sourcing, rather than adopt a prime-contractor model of tendering, the 
government ought to facilitate Police and Crime Commissioners, PCCs, to contract on behalf 
of the public for probation services. This would support more devolved models of probation. 
The pooling of criminal justice budgets would allow a more strategic approach to reducing 
re-offending with more emphasis on early intervention and preventative approaches and a 
stronger place-based approach (Fox et al. 2013). This model is likely to be particularly 
effective in areas where PCCs are also ‘metro-mayors’ and devolution deals are in place – 
allowing a more integrated service in which to support the offenders’ rehabilitation needs. 
This will, in turn, facilitate the realisation of our third recommendation. 
iii. Building relationships. Government must place the development of effective, individual 
relationships at the heart of probation. There is both evidence (e.g. Smith et al. 2018) and 
theory (e.g. Weaver 2012) that supports such an approach. It follows offenders ought to be 
the responsibility of a specified probation officer throughout supervision: There should be 
one person to oversee the rehabilitation process on behalf of the public and the offender. 
The ineffectual model of TR adopted in 2013 is very much a top-down experiment. It failed 
to consider the point of view of offenders and probation staff. A more effective approach 
might involve mandated elements of co-production and co-creation of services. Such models 
have been developed in other sectors, most notably social care, and are being piloted in the 
criminal justice sector (Fox et al. 2018). 
9. Conclusions 
The neo-liberal political paradigm has suggested, with limited empirical support, private provision of 
public services is generally more efficient than state provision. In practice, however, the market 
often falls short of delivering on its theoretical promise.  
However well founded ideologically was the UK government’s original intention to allow local 
probation trusts to subcontract at the local level, the ultimate outcome of the TR agenda in 
probation is financially unsustainable and (socially) sub-optimal.  
Marketisation, like most policy proposals, is neither an effective or ineffective policy in its own right; 
much depends on the scale. Economic theory – and the history of UK marketisation – suggest 
smaller and localised is better. Yet, in practice, TR is associated neither with increasing the number 
of providers, nor the localisation of criminal justice. The first round of the innovation saw 35 local 
probation trusts replaced with a National Probation Service and 21 Community Rehabilitation 
Companies. The next round will see ten fewer CRCs and a corresponding increase in the 
centralisation of provision.  
Financially, the inflexibility of the TR contracts meant staff could not be moved from supervising less- 
to more-serious offenders as the crime mix changed. This created problems of under-resourcing in 
the NPS and insufficient throughput in CRCs. Further, CRCs were unable to produce the ‘results’ 
under which PbR contracts would meet their financial requirements. This necessitated increased 
public expenditure to maintain probation provision. Ultimately, the experiment proved 
unsustainable and was abandoned ahead of schedule. 
Socially, there is a deal of evidence that the process of privatisation and marketisation itself, and the 
government’s rhetorical promotion of self-interest and the profit principle, are counter-productive. 
Market-based incentive structures, focussed as they are on cost saving subject to the profitability of 
the corporate sector, are associated with the undermining of generalised prosperity and the 
evolution of asocial norms. The process of marketisation is socially divisive. The ethical 
underpinnings of a liberal democracy are thus incrementally undermined. 
In rehabilitation, it is possible to do more justice with less privatisation and marketisation. 
References 
Albertson, K. (2014) ‘Markets, Privatisation and Law and Order – Some Economic Considerations’, in 
Criminal Justice Matters 97(1), pp.4-5. 
Albertson, K. and Fox, C. (2014) Justice, with Reason: Rethinking the economics of crime and justice, 
Issues in Community and Criminal Justice Monograph No. 9: Napo 
www.napo.org.uk/members/journals/issues-community-and-criminal-justice [accessed 10/9/2018]. 
Albertson, K., Bailey, K., Fox, C., LaBarbera, J., O’Leary, C., Painter, G. (2018) Payment by Results and 
Social Impact Bonds: Outcome-based payment systems in the UK and US. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Appelbaum, E. (2017) ‘Domestic Outsourcing, Rent Seeking, and Increasing Inequality’, in Review of 
Radical Political Economics 49(4), pp.513-528. 
Ariely, D. (2008) Predictably Irrational: The hidden forces that shape our decisions. London: Harper 
Collins. 
Atkinson, A.B. (2015) Inequality. Harvard University Press. 
Becker, G.S. (1968) ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’, in Journal of Political Economy 
76, pp.169-217. 
Bell, E. (2011) Criminal Justice and Neoliberalism. Palgrave: Macmillan. 
Bevan, G., and Hood, C. (2006) ‘What’s Measured is What Matters: Targets and Gaming in the 
English Public Health Care System’, in Public Administration 84(3), pp.517-538. 
Buchanan, J., Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A. and Williams, K. (2009) Undisclosed and Unsustainable: 
Problems of the UK National Business Model. Working Paper No.75, Open University Centre for 
Research on Socio-Cultural Change, Milton Keynes. 
Cabinet Office (2011) Modernising Commissioning: Increasing the role of charities, social enterprises, 
mutuals and cooperatives in public service delivery. London: Cabinet Office. 
Cabinet Office (2013) Government Awards £500,000 to Support Probation Mutual. Press Release 3 
July 2013, London: Cabinet Office. 
Cameron, D. (2012) Speech on “Moral Capitalism”. https://www.newstatesman.com/uk-
politics/2012/01/economy-capitalism-market [accessed 30/7/2018]. 
Cameron, D. (2013) Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2013: Prime Minister’s speech. Online at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/lord-mayors-banquet-2013-prime-ministers-speech 
[accessed 13/6/2016]. 
Campbell, D.T. (1979) ‘Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change’, in Evaluation And Program 
Planning 2(1), pp.67-90. 
Cattell, J. (2018) Probation Performance: Fewer reoffenders committing more crimes. 
http://www.russellwebster.com/crcpbrjan18/ [accessed 5/9/2018]. 
Cavadino, M. and Dignan, J. (2006) ‘Penal Policy and Political Economy’, in Criminology and Criminal 
Justice 6(4), pp.435-456. 
Clinks (2016) Change & Challenge: The voluntary sector’s role in Transforming Rehabilitation. 
http://www.clinks.org/resources-reports/change-challenge-voluntary-sector-role-transforming-
rehabilitation [accessed 15/6/2016]. 
Connell, R., Fawcett, B. and Meagher, G. (2009) ‘Neoliberalism, New Public Management and the 
Human Service Professions’, in Journal of Sociology 5(4), pp.331-338. 
Currie, E. (2013) Crime and Punishment in America. Macmillan. 
Dorling, D. (2017) The Equality Effect. New Internationalist. 
Ehrlich, I. (1973) ‘Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A theoretical and empirical investigation’, in 
The Journal of Political Economy 81(3), pp.521-565. 
Ehrlich, I. (1996) ‘Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses’, in The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 10(1), pp.43-67. 
Elliott, M. and Kanagasooriam, J. (2017) Public opinion in the post-Brexit era: Economic attitudes in 
modern Britain. Legatum Institute. https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-
source/default-library/1710-public-opinion-in-the-post-brexit-era-final.pdf [accessed 3/9/2018]. 
Feldstein, M.S. (1986) Supply Side Economics: Old truths and new claims. NBER Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 1792. http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/6707885.pdf [accessed 
10/9/2018]. 
Fitzgibbon, W. and Lea, J. (2014) ‘Defending Probation: Beyond Privatisation and Security’, in 
European Journal of Probation 6, pp.24-41. 
Fox, C. and Marsh, C. (2016) ‘“Personalisation”: Is social innovation possible under transforming 
rehabilitation?’, in Probation Journal 63(2), pp.169-181. 
Fox, C., Albertson, K. and Wong, K. (2013) Justice Reinvestment: Can the criminal justice system 
deliver more for less?. London: Routledge. 
Fox, C., and Albertson, K. (2011) ‘Payment by Results and Social Impact Bonds in the Criminal Justice 
Sector: New challenges for the concept of evidence-based policy?’, in Criminology & Criminal Justice 
11(5), pp.395-413. 
Fox, C., Bannister, J., & Miszczak, P. (2016) ‘The 2010-2015 Coalition and Criminal Justice: 
Continuities and contradictions’, in Safer Communities 15(2), pp.110-120. 
Fox, C., Harrison, J., Marsh, C. and Smith, A. (2018) ‘Piloting Different Approaches to Personalised 
Offender Management in the English Criminal Justice System’, in European Sociological Review 28(1), 
pp.35-61. 
Fraser, A., Tan, S., Lagarde, M. and Mays, N. (2018) ‘Narratives of Promise, Narratives of Caution: A 
review of the literature on Social Impact Bonds’, in Social Policy and Administration 52(1), pp.4-28. 
Friedman, B.M. (2006) ‘The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth’, in Society 43 (2), pp.15-22. 
Friedman, M. (1962) Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Friedman, M. (1970) ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’, in The New York 
Times Magazine (13 September). 
http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html 
[accessed 9/9/2018]. 
Garland, D. (1996) ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of crime control in contemporary 
society’, in The British Journal of Criminology 36(4), pp.445-471. 
Gneezy, U. and Rustichini, A. (2000a) ‘A Fine is a Price’, in Journal of Legal Studies 29 (1), pp.1-17. 
Gneezy, U., and Rustichini, A. (2000b) ‘Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All’, in Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115 (3), pp. 791-810. 
Gore, C. (2000) ‘The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing 
Countries’, in World Development 28(5), pp.789-804. 
Gough, D., (2012) ‘Revolution’: Marketisation, the Penal System and the Voluntary Sector’, in 
Silvestri, A. (ed.) Critical Reflections: Social and Criminal Justice in the First Year of Coalition 
Government. London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies. 
Greenwood, D.T. (2014) The Decision to Contract Out: Understanding the full economic and social 
impacts. Colorado Center for Policy Studies. 
https://www.uccs.edu/Documents/ccps/2014/contracts-broaderimpacts-greenwood-march-2014-
REVISED-AND-FINAL.pdf [accessed 10/9/2018]. 
Hall, P.A. (1993) ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The case of economic 
policymaking in Britain’, in Comparative Politics 25 (3), pp.275-296. 
Hall, S. (2011) ‘The Neo-liberal Revolution’, in Cultural Studies 25(6), pp.705-728. 
Harvey, J.T. (2012) Why Government Should Not Be Run Like A Business. Forbes (5 October). 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johntharvey/2012/10/05/government-vs-business/#623444ed2a54 
[accessed 3/9/2018]. 
Her Majesty’s Government (2007) Offender Management Act 2007. London: The Stationery Office. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/21/contents [accessed 10/6/2016]. 
Her Majesty’s Government (2011) Open Public Services White Paper. London: Cabinet Office. 
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/255288/OpenPubli
cServices-WhitePaper.pdf [accessed 10/6/2016]. 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation (2017) 2017 Annual Report. London: HMIP. 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation (2018) Probation Supply Chains. London: HMIP. 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation and HM Inspectorate of Prisons (2017) An Inspection of 
Through the Gate Resettlement Services for Prisoners Serving 12 Months or More. London: Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/cjji/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2017/06/Through-the-Gate-phase-2-report.pdf [accessed 5/9/2018]. 
High Pay Centre (2014) Winners and Losers: The great privatisation game. London: High Pay Centre. 
http://highpaycentre.org/pubs/winners-and-losers-the-great-privatisation-game [accessed 
16/6/2016]. 
Hills, J. (2011) ‘The Changing Architecture of the UK Welfare State’ in Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 27(4), pp. 589-607.  
Hobbes, T. (1651) Leviathan. https://archive.org/details/hobbessleviathan00hobbuoft [accessed 
10/9/2018]. 
House of Commons Justice Committee (2014) Crime Reduction Policies: A co-ordinated approach? 
Interim report on the Government's Transforming Rehabilitation programme, Justice Committee - 
Twelfth Report. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmjust/1004/1004.pdf 
[accessed 10/9/2018]. 
Institute for Government (2012) The Privatisation of British Telecom (1984). 
http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/british_telecom_privatisation.pdf 
[accessed 15/6/2016]. 
King, A. and Crewe, I. (2014) The Blunders of our Governments. Oneworld Publications. 
Kirton, G. and Guillaume, C. (2015) Employment Relations and Working Conditions in Probation after 
Transforming Rehabilitation With a special focus on gender and union effects. NAPO. 
https://www.napo.org.uk/sites/default/files/BR 112-2015 Appendix A - Gill Kirton Report.doc 
[accessed 16/6/2016]. 
Levitt, S.D., and Dubner, S.J. (2005) Freakonomics: A rogue economist explores the hidden side of 
everything. William Morrow/HarperCollins. 
Lowe, T. (2017) ‘Debate: Complexity and the performance of social interventions’, in Public Money 
and Management 37(2), pp.79-80. 
Ludlow, A. (2014) ‘Transforming Rehabilitation: What lessons might be learnt from prison 
privatisation?’, in European Journal of Probation 6, pp.67-81. 
MacIver, R.M. (1947) The Web of Government. New York: MacMillan. 
Mazar, N., Amir, O. and Ariely, D. (2008) ‘The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of self-concept 
maintenance’, in Journal of Marketing Research 45(6), pp.633-644. 
Mazar, N., and Ariely, D. (2006) ‘Dishonesty in Everyday Life and its Policy Implications’, in Journal of 
Public Policy and Marketing 25, pp.1-21. 
McLean, I., Haubrich, D., and Gutiérrez-Romero, R. (2007) ‘The Perils and Pitfalls of Performance 
Measurement: The CPA regime for local authorities in England’, in Public Money and Management 
27(2), pp.111-118. 
Ministry of Justice (2010) Breaking the Cycle: Effective punishment, rehabilitation and sentencing of 
offenders. London: Ministry of Justice. 




Ministry of Justice (2013a) Transforming Rehabilitation - A revolution in the way we manage 
offenders. London, Ministry of Justice. https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-
communications/transforming-rehabilitation/supporting_documents/transformingrehabilitation.pdf 
[accessed 10/6/2016]. 




Ministry of Justice (2014a) Target Operating Model. London: MoJ. 
Ministry of Justice (2014b) The New Owners of the Community Rehabilitation Companies. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389727/table-of-
new-owners-of-crcs.pdf [accessed 13/6/2016]. 
Ministry of Justice (2014c) Transforming Rehabilitation Programme Payment Mechanism. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/community-rehabilitation-company-contracts 
[accessed 13/6/2016]. 
Ministry of Justice (2014d) Transforming Rehabilitation: A summary of evidence on reducing 
reoffending (second edition). London: Ministry of Justice. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/305319/transforming-rehabilitation-evidence-summary-2nd-edition.pdf [accessed 5/9/2018]. 
Ministry of Justice (2018) Strengthening Probation, Building Confidence. London: MoJ. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/strengthening-probation-building-confidence 
[accessed 10/9/2018]. 
Mullainathan, S., and Shafir, E. (2013) Scarcity: Why having too little means so much. Macmillan. 
National Audit Office (2015) Outcome-based Payment Schemes: Government’s use of payment by 
results. London: NAO Communications https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Outcome-based-payment-schemes-governments-use-of-payment-by-
results.pdf [accessed 5/9/2018]. 
National Audit Office (2017) Investigation into Changes to Community Rehabilitation Company 
Contracts. London: NAO Communications. https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/Investigation-into-changes-to-Community-Rehabilitation-Company-
contracts.pdf [accessed 5/9/2018]. 
Osborne, S. (2006) ‘Editorial: The New Public Governance’, in New Public Management Review 8(3), 
pp.377-387. 
Park, A., Bryson, C. and Curtice, J. (eds.) (2014) British Social Attitudes: The 31st Report. London: 
NatCen Social Research. http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/ [accessed Research, available at: 
10/09/2018]. 
Park, A., Clery, E., Curtice, J., Phillips, M. and Utting, D. (eds.) (2012) British Social Attitudes: The 29th 
Report. London: NatCen Social Research. 
Patrick, R. (2011) ‘A Nod and a Wink: Do ‘gaming practices’ provide an insight into the organisational 
nature of police corruption?’, in The Police Journal, 84 (3), pp.199-221. 
Reiner, R. (2007) ‘Neoliberalism, Crime and Justice’, in Roberts, R. and McMahon, W. (eds.) Social 
Justice and Criminal Justice. London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies. 
Rhodes, C., Hough, D. and Butcher, L. (2014) Business and Transport Section Privatisation. House of 
Commons Library, Research Paper 14/61. 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP14-61/RP14-61.pdf [accessed 3/9/2018]. 
Röpke, W. (1952) The Social Crisis of our Time. Transaction Publishers. 
Schmieder, J., & Goldschmidt, D. (2016) ‘Domestic Outsourcing Reduces Wages and Contributes to 
Rising Inequality’, in Employment Research Newsletter 23(1), 2:4-6. 
Smith, A., Heyes, K., Fox, C., Harrison, J., Kiss, Z. and Bradury, A. (2018, in press) ‘The Effectiveness of 
Probation Supervision Towards Reducing Reoffending: A Rapid Evidence Assessment’, in The 
Probation Journal. 
Stout, L. (2011) Cultivating Conscience. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Stout, L. (2012) ‘Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of “Pay For 
Performance”’, in Journal of Corporation Law 39, pp.525-561 
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2526&context=facpub [accessed 
10/9/2018]. 
Thatcher, M. (1977) Iain Macleod Memorial Lecture – “Dimensions of Conservatism”. (4 July) 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103411 [accessed 1/8/2018]. 
Thatcher, M. (1986) Speech to Conservative Party Conference (10 October). 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106498 [accessed 1/8/2018]. 
The Cabinet Office (2014) Transforming Rehabilitation. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402141901/http://mutuals.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/tr
ansforming-rehabilitation [accessed 13/6/2016]. 
The Equality Trust (2014) Subsidising Unfairness: How outsourcing companies use of taxpayers’ 
money increases inequality. London: The Equality Trust. 
https://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/sites/default/files/Subsidising-Unfairness.pdf [accessed 
1/8/2018]. 
Times, The (2018) Private probation reforms collapse at cost of £170m (27 July). 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/private-probation-reforms-collapse-at-cost-of-170m-cbgrgpxgl 
[accessed 5/9/2018]. 
Van Horn, R. and Mirowski, P. (2008) ‘The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics and the Birth of 
Neoliberalism’, in Mirowski, P. and Plehwe, D. (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The making of the 
neoliberal thought collective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Wacquant, L. (2009) Punishing the Poor: The neoliberal government of social insecurity. Duke 
University Press. 
Wacquant, L. (2012) ‘The Punitive Regulation of Poverty in the Neoliberal Age’, in Criminal Justice 
Matters 89 (1), pp.38-40. 
Weaver, B. (2012) ‘The Relational Context of Desistance: Some implications and opportunities for 
social policy’, in Social Policy and Administration 46(4), pp.395-412. 
Weil, D. (2014) The Fissured Workplace: Why work became so bad for so many and what can be 
done to improve it. Harvard University Press. 
Wilkinson, R.G. and Pickett, K. (2009) The Spirit Level: Why more equal societies almost always do 
better. London, Allen Lane. 
Williamson, J. (1999) What Should the Bank Think About the Washington Consensus? Paper 
prepared as a background to the World Bank’s World Development Report 2000. 
http://www.financialpolicy.org/financedev/williamson.pdf [accessed 10/6/2016]. 
YouGov (2015) Nationalisation Debate: It’s not about ‘whatever works’. 
https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/03/12/nationalisation-ideology-beats-pragmatism/ [accessed 
15/6/2016]. 
Zak, P.J. (2011) ‘Moral Markets’, in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 77(2): 212-233. 
